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I. Background
On April 11, 2000, an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal of first instance issued
an international arrest warrant in absentia against Mr. Abdulaye Yoridia Ndombasi.1 The
warrant was issued for offences constituting grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, and the Additional Protocols thereto, and crimes against humanity.2 At the time of
the arrest warrant issuance, Ndombasi was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo.' The Ndombasi warrant was circulated to both the international
criminal police organization (Interpol) and the Congolese authorities.4
Accordingly, on October 17, 2000, the Republic of Congo filed, in the registry of the
ICJ, an application instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium in respect to
a dispute concerning the issuance of the international arrest warrant against the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo.' In its application, the Republic
of Congo contended that Belgium had not acted in accordance with the principles of
*Senior prosecutor, Office of the Attorney General of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Egyptian Ministry of
Justice (2000-present); Prosecutor Egyptian Ministry ofJustice (1997-2000); First Lieutenant, Special Guard-
ing Unit, Ministry of Interior (1995-1997); First Lieutenant, Special Forces-Anti-terrorism Unit, Ministry of
Interior (1993-1995); Ph.D. cand.; LL.M. (International Human Rights-Irish Centre for Human Rights-
National University of Ireland Galway, 2001); LL.M. (Public Law-Cario University, 1999); LL.B. (Police
Academy-Cario, 1993); BS (Bachelor of Police Sciences-Police Academy, 1993). Special thanks to Professor
William Schabas for commenting on an earlier draft of this article, and to Noelle Higgins.
1. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 2002
I.CJ, (Feb. 14, 2002), 1 1 [hereinafter Congo v. Belgium Case]. See also Annex:Arrest Warrant of] I April2000
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 8 ANN. SURV. INT'L & Comp. L. 151 (2002) (summarizing the judgment
of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium).
2. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, IT 13, 15, 67. The acts were committed in 1998, before Mr.
Yerodia became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Those acts included speeches "allegedly inciting attacks on the
Tutsi population in Kinshasa." See Steffen Virth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the Congo
v. Belgium Case, 13 EuR. J. INr'L L. 877, 878 (2002).
3. Id.
4. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 1 14.
5. Id. 1 1.
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international law. It based this challenge mainly on three grounds: (1) that Belgium had
violated "the principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another
State"; (2) that it had infringed the "principle of sovereign equality among all members of
the United Nations as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter of the United
Nations"; and (3) that it had violated the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of a sovereign State."
6
Thus, the Republic of Congo's application relied on two main arguments. First, it claimed
that "[t]he universal jurisdiction that the Belgian State attributes to itself under article 7 of
[its law] constituted a violation" 7 of the first two aforementioned points and, secondly, it
claimed that "[t]he non recognition, on the basis of Article 5 ... of the Belgian Law, of the
immunity of a Minister of Foreign Affairs in Office constituted a violation of [his] diplo-
matic immunity."'
The Republic of Congo's memorial and final submissions presented at the end of the
oral proceedings, however, excluded the first legal ground, namely, the pleas regarding
universal jurisdiction.9 Thus, the Republic of Congo focused on the issue concerning the
violation of a norm of customary international law that grants a Foreign Minister "absolute
inviolability and immunity" from criminal jurisdiction. Thus, the arrest warrant of April
11, 2000 would be unlawful on this assumption. 0 Belgium countered and invoked the non
ultra petita rule, which operates to restrict the jurisdiction of the ICJ to those issues that
are the subject of the Republic of Congo's final submissions. Therefore, Belgium requested
that the ICJ refrain from ruling on the question of whether the rules and principles of
international law permit the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia where the accused
person is not present on the Belgium territory."
Interestingly, the ICJ replied that "it is [its] duty not only to reply to the questions as
stated in the final submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not
included in those submissions, [and] thus [it is] not entitled to decide upon questions not
asked of it, it did not preclude, however, the possibility of addressing certain legal points
relevant to the main issue."' 2 The ICJ held that the non ultra petita rule would not preclude
it from answering part of the question in the operative part of the judgment, namely,
whether the issuance of the arrest warrant on the ground of universal jurisdiction in absentia
complied with the rules of international law.'" Furthermore, the ICJ considered it necessary
to rule on this issue before ruling on the question of immunity.' 4 Despite this promising
and progressive step taken by the court, it avoided ruling on this question on the merits of
the case and thus left the judgment open for criticism. Alternatively, several judges made
some comments in their dissenting and separate opinions as seen below.
6. Id.
7. Id. 9 17. Article 7 contains a jurisdictional clause, which reads, in part, as follows: "Belgian courts shall
be competent to deal with breaches provided for in the present Act, irrespective of where such breaches have
been committed." Belgian Law, Loi relative i la repression des violations graves du droit international bumanitaire
(Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law) (Feb. 1999).
8. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 1 17.
9. Id.121.
10. Id. f 41.
ll. Id.
12. Id. f 43.
13. Id.
14. Id. 46.
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This study is devoted to examining the question of universal jurisdiction in absentia and
seeks to (1) shed light on the concept of universality, (2) answer the question of absolute
universal jurisdiction in the abstract, and (3) answer the question in light of the judgment
of the ICJ in Congo.
II. The Idea behind Universality ofJurisdiction
Under international law there are different forms of jurisdiction, each requiring a certain
link. 5 These forms are territoriality, 6 active personality,1" passive personality," and protec-
tive principles.' 9
Unlike these forms of jurisdiction, the universality principle does not require any link
between the state demanding to assert jurisdiction and the offence.zo Arguably, the only
requirement is the voluntary physical presence of the person on the territory of the state
that demands to exercise jurisdiction (judex loci deprehensionis).2' But, the latter requirement
is not absolute and might be questionable.
The term universal jurisdiction in absentia connotes at least three different meanings. It
could refer to the possibility of initiating proceedings in the absence of the offender. Hence,
international arrest warrants may be issued to secure the offender's presence to stand trial.
It may, however, go further by using enforcement means, such as abductions. Finally, it
could refer to trials in absentia. I argue more in favor of the first meaning, because the
second and third meanings might involve or trigger human rights issues. But, as will be
demonstrated by the current study, the language used in some cases is broad and may be
construed to support even the third meaning of the term.22 If the language goes as far as
15. For a thorough discussion regarding the various forms of jurisdiction, see Christopher L. Blakesley,
Ea'traterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
43-69 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Transnational Publishers 2d ed. 1999); D. V. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing
Patterns ofAuthority over Activities and Resources, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY RRADINCS
210-217 (Charlotte Ku et al. eds., Lynne Rienner Pub]. 1998); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 56-77 (Clarendon Press 1994); Covey T. Oliver, The Jurisdiction
(Competence) of States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 307-321 (Mohammed Bedjaoui
ed., Unesco 1991); GEORG SCHWARZENRERGER & E. D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-79 (6th
ed. 1976); D.J. LATHAM BROWN, PURLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12l-126 (Sweet & Maxwell 1970).
16. The place where the crime is committed.
17. Where the accused is a national of the state asserting jurisdiction.
18. 'Where the act perpetrated abroad affected the nationals of the state claiming jurisdiction.
19. According to this principle a state may exercise jurisdiction over aliens who have committed an act
abroad which prejudiced the security of that state.
20. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 227 (2d ed. 1999); HOWARD
S. LEViE, TERRORISM IN \VAR-THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 230-231 (1992).
21. Luc Reydams, Prosecuting Crimes Under International Law on the Basis of Universal Jurisdiction: The Ex-
perience of Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 812 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001); LEVIE, supra note 20, at 231; see, e.g., Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970, art. 4(2); Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971, art. 5(2). However, these conventions only
cover crimes described as international terrorism. But see Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the
Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 303, n.37 (2002) (noting that, "[siome states assert the
capacity to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia.").
22. See, e.g., Der Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of February 21, 2001, 3 STR 372/00, 20, available at http:/
www.bundesgerichtshof.de/ [hereinafter Sokolovic Case]; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, T 57
(Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Case].
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supporting trials in absentia, by implication, initiating investigations and issuing interna-
tional arrests warrants would be possible.
The genesis of the universal jurisdiction principle could be traced back to two different
periods in history and two different categories. As Professor Bassiouni has noted, the history
of universal jurisdiction "stems [from] the customary international practices regarding pi-
rates and brigands in the 1600s; even before international law in the modem sense of the
term was in existence."23 Commentators of the sixteenth century, such as Francisco de
Vitoria, and those of the seventeenth century, such as Hugo Grotius, "recognized it as a
general principle of law applicable to crimes under international law and ordinary crimes.
2 4
On the other hand, Professor Sunga pointed out that the principle of universal jurisdiction,
with regards to violations of international humanitarian law, dates back to the fourteenth
century when thejus militaire became part of thejus gentium, and "the military profession
became widely recognized as an honorable profession governed by thejusgentium."25 Honor
was of the utmost importance to the military and breach of the rules and customs of the
jus militaire was seen as a breach of honor, which led to the instigation of universal juris-
diction. While the gravity of the piracy crime and the need to protect the interest of the
international community was an element for triggering universal jurisdiction, the fact that
it was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state was the rationale for its
application. 26 This is different than the idea of universality in regard to war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide, where only the seriousness of those crimes is the rationale
for its application.
2
23. BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 229; see also A. Hays Butler, The Doctrine of UniversalJurisdiction:A Review
of the Literature, 11 CRIM. L. F. 353, 357 (2000). According to Oppenheim, "[with regard to pirates] [e]very
state has, by international law, the right, on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
state, to seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, arrest the
persons and arrest the property on board." ROBERT JENNINGS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 753 (Arthur
Watts ed., 1992). See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM.J. INT'L L. 269(1988) (discussing further the issue of universal jurisdiction
for piracy). Marc Henzelin, Le Principe De L' Universalit En Droit Penal International: Droit et obligation pour les
Etates de poursouivre etjuger selon le principe de luniversalit (Bale/Geneve/Munich: Bruxelles, 2000) (providing
a thorough historical survey of universal jurisdiction); see also ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY at 102 ff
(2d ed. 1998).
24. Amnesty International, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTv TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION Ch.
II. (2001), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/icc/ujqanda.pdf; see also Henzelin, supra note 23, at 90-97.
Henzelin quoted Vitoria when he made reference to universal jurisdiction in the following: "en vertu du droit
naturel, le pouvoir de punir et de chattier ses propres citoyens quand ils lui portent prejudice, (alors) le monde
le possede (rait) sans aucun doute vis-a-vis de tous ceux qui lui portent prejudice et ne vivent pas bumainement
(m ne s'il) ne l'exerce (rait) que par l'intermdiaire des princes." Id. at 90. While Grotius stated: ". . . les rois,
et ceux qui ont un pouvoir 6gal a celui des rois, ont le droit d'infliger des peines non seulement pour des injures
commises contre eux ou leurs sujets, mais encore pour celles qui ne les touchent pas, et qui violent a l'exces le
droit de nature ou des gens a l'gard de qui que ce soit." Id. at 97.
25. LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIO-
LATIONS 102-03 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1992).
26. Id. at 103. He expressed himself in the following words: "[Tlhe basis for universal jurisdiction as it arose
in connection with efforts to suppress slave-trading and piracy relates primarily to the peculiar character of the
locus delicti, rather than to the serious nature of the crime."
27. Id. at 104. Sunga refers to the differences of their rationale in the following words: "Unfortunately,
confusion between the two rationale for universal jurisdiction appears in some of the efforts at codification, in
adjudication, and in certain doctrinal works."
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Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, each and every state has jurisdiction to try
particular offences. As Randall stated:
Tihis principle provides every state with jurisdiction over a limited category of offenses gen-
erally recognized as of universal concern, regardless of the situs of the offense and the nation-
alities of the offender and the offended. While the other jurisdictional bases demand direct
connections between the prosecuting state and the offense, the universality principle assumes
that every state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious offenses that
states universally have condemned."
The rationale for such an extension of jurisdiction is that crimes such as genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity are an affront to humanity and, therefore, are of con-
cern to all states.2 9 The demand for universal jurisdiction is compelling. Justice and law
should intervene when innocent human beings are slaughtered, tortured, and subjected to
other inhumane treatment. Thus, perpetrators of those crimes should not be granted safe
haven. In spite of the latter goal, the question that poses itself in this context is whether
the demand for this form of jurisdiction is conditional and thus dependent on the presence
of the accused in the territory of the state that asserts jurisdiction. The early reference to
this principle in post-war trials and its codification in some treaties might be of useful
guidance to examine this question.
IM. The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and
Subsequent Trials
While it is debatable that the IMT jurisdiction was based on the idea of universality, the
statement made by the IMT in its judgment at Nuremberg at least makes reference to the
recognition and existence of such a principle over crimes against the peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. The IMT stated:
28. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788 (1988). See
also Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 26 (1968) (where the court mentioned the core reason for applying
the universality principle: "[Tihe abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are not crimes under Israel law alone.
These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offences
against the law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium). Therefore, so far from international law negating or
limiting the jurisdiction of countries with respect to such crimes, international law is, in the absence of an
International Court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of every country to give effect to its criminal
interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is
universal." Although Eichemann's apprehension was illegal, it could reflect one of the types of universality in
absentia; namely taking action to secure his presence. The court, however, exercised jurisdiction notwithstanding
his abduction. I do not believe that exercising universality of jurisdiction in this way is valid and in conformity
with the norms of international law. Sinilarly, in the Finta case the court observed that "some acts are crimes
under international law. They may be punished by any state which has custody of the accused. Example of this
... basis of jurisdiction include breaches of the laws of war." R. v. Finta (Can.) I S.C.R. 701, $ 171 (1994).
29. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (1988); see also Bruce T. Smith, Assertion ofAdjudicatoryjuris-
diction by United States Courts over International Terrorism Cases, 1991 ARMy LAW. 13 (1991) (noting that "[tlhe
basis for universal jurisdiction that the offense violates the law of nations and humanity and that, in effect, the
prosecuting state is acting on behalf of all nations by bringing the criminal to justice."); see also Bruno Simma
& Andreas L. Paulus, Symposium on Method in International Law: The Responsibility of Individualsfor Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 Ams. J. INTr'L L. 302, 314 (1999) (emphasizing that "the estab-
lishment of universal jurisdiction for genocide and crimes against humanity, even if committed by aliens against
aliens abroad, seems almost universally to be considered permissible, although the Genocide Convention is
silent on the matter . . . Universal jurisdiction for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions seems to be
increasingly accepted.").
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[T]he Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made
regulations for the proper conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any
one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right
to set up special courts to administer law. With regard to the Constitution of the Court, all
that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the facts and law.3"
The U.N. Secretary General construed this statement, in the 1949 Report on the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, as stating, "[the] Court considered the crimes under the Charter to be, as
international crimes, subject to the jurisdiction of every state," 31 and accordingly, subject
to universal jurisdiction. 32 Although the statement made by the tribunal may be construed
as supporting the universality principle, it did not explain how far this principle could be
applied and whether there were any restrictions on its application. But, reading the entire
paragraph in light of the statement, "in doing so, they have done together what any one of
them might have done singly," arguably supports a theoretical proposition that if any of
them had to exercise universal jurisdiction, nothing would have prevented any of them from
applying it in an absolute manner without any restrictions regarding the presence of the
accused on the territory of that state. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the Allied
Powers demanded, by all means necessary, to place those criminals on trial. It follows from
the final sentence of the statement, "all that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive
a fair trial," that any legal procedure could have been adopted to bring those persons to
justice. Once present, their trial should be fair. It is the strong and wide language used by
the tribunal that suggests this reading.
On the other hand, the concept of universality jurisdiction gained support during the
post-World War II trials in the U.S. and British military courts. The language used by
those tribunals, however, inclined more toward conditional universal jurisdiction, namely
restricting its application to the presence of the accused in the prosecuting state's custody
at the time the proceedings were initiating.
In the Hadamar Trial," a military commission appointed by the Commanding General
of the Seventh U.S. Army, tried Alfons Klein and six others for violating the laws of war.
In examining the possibility of exercising jurisdiction, the commission stated:
30. The International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 216-17 (1947); see also Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the International
Criminal Court, 29 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 19 (2001).
31. See Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 337, 344 (2001); see also Matthew Lippman, International Law and Human Rights Edition: Crimes Against
Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L-J. 171, 238 (1997).
32. BASSIOUNI, supra note 20, at 235-36 ("[T]he foundation for the application of the universality principle
to war crimes, as well as crimes against humanits, stems from the proceedings before the IMT and subsequent
trials.... It may be inferred from [the above] statement that "any nation" would have jurisdiction to prosecute
the war criminals, whether or not the nation had a nexus with the offenses at issue . . . This conclusion is
supported by [the] memorandum prepared by the United Nations Secretary General."). However, Professor
Bassiouni's recently expressed a different view point regarding the IT's jurisdictional basis when he stated,
"In both the L'IT and L\IFFE, the states in question exercise their powers to enforce international criminal
law on a territorial jurisdictional basis because they exercised defacto sovereign prerogatives over the occupied
territories where these tribunals were established .. .it could be said [that the IMT and IMTFE] have also
relied on "passive personality." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 91, 118 (2001) (hereinafter Universal ]urisdiction).
Nonetheless, both arguments have merit. Also, Professor's Morris's argued that "neither the Nuremberg nor
the Tokyo tribunal based its competence on the collective exercise of universal jurisdiction." Madeline Morris,
High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 37 (2001).
33. 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES CoMM'N LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 46 (1945).
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[t]he Commission had to decide the question whether it could assume jurisdiction despite the
fact that the crime, committed by foreigners outside United States territory, had not affected
United States nationals.. .The Commission decided the question in the affirmative [and thus]
the ... reasons sustaining the Commission's jurisdiction can be adduced from (a) the general
doctrine recently expounded and called "universality of jurisdiction over war crimes," which
has the support of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and according to which every
independent State has, under International Law, jurisdiction to punish not only pirates but also
war criminals in its custody, regardless of the nationality of the victim or of the place where
the offence was committed, particularly where, for some reason, the criminal would otherwise
go unpunished.14
Moreover, in the Almelo" and Zyklon B16 cases, the same principle was adopted by the British
Military Courts. The cases stated that "under the general doctrine called universality of
jurisdiction over war crimes, every independent state has an international law jurisdiction
to punish pirates and war criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim
or the place where the offence was committed.""
A close reading of the texts previously referred to suggests that any state could punish
war criminals by virtue of universal jurisdiction, but only when they are found in that state's
custody. But, the question remains, how could that person be found in the state's custody?
Is it the voluntary presence of the accused, his surrender to the detaining power, incidentally
being present at the time of his arrest or capture, being captured in the territory of the
detaining power, or being absent and subsequently issuing an arrest warrant accompanied
with an extradition request to ensure his custody? If the language points to the last scenario,
then it is possible to argue that the military courts were authorized by the practice of
absolute universality.
Nevertheless, in Eisentrager and others, 8 the U.S. Military Commission in China, which
tried the German Lothar Eisentraeger and others for violations of laws and customs of war
committed in China against the United States, made no reference to such a requirement
when stating:
[A] war crime, however, is not a crime against the law of or criminal code of any individual
nation, but a crime against thejus gentium. The laws and usages of war are of universal appli-
cation, and do not depend for their existence upon national laws or frontiers. Arguments to
the effect that only a sovereign state of the locus criminis has jurisdiction and that only the lex
loci can be applied, are therefore without any foundation.' "
Unlike the abovementioned cases that explicitly required the presence of the accused in the
state's custody at the time of the initiating proceedings, the wording of the U.S. Commis-
sion in this case seems does not make reference to any restriction when applying universal
jurisdiction over a war crime. Thus, it left room for different interpretations. An exami-
nation of the facts of this case, however, suggests that the U.S. Commission exercised
34. Id. at 52-53.
35. 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N LAW REPORTS OFTRIALS OF VAR CRIMINALS 35 (1945)(hereinafterAlmelo).
36. 1 U.N. WAR CRIMES COISI'N LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF VAR CRIMINALS 93, 103 (1946) (hereinafter
Zyklon B).
37. Almelo, supra note 35, at 42.
38. 14 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF VAR CRIMINALS 8 (1947) (hereinafter Ei-
sentrager).
39. Id. at 15.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreigners who committed crimes against foreigners-a
sort of absolute universal jurisdiction (in absentia). In this case, the United States extended
its jurisdiction over Shanghai even though the accused persons were German nationals,
who had committed their crimes in China and were residents of China at the time of
initiating proceedings. Thus, no links existed between the United States and the accused.4
IV. Absolute Universal Jurisdiction in light of Recent
Jurisprudence and Contemporary National Legislations
It is interesting to note that while some of the national legislations do not support uni-
versal jurisdiction without any connection between the offender and the forum state, others
do allow such exercises of jurisdiction in an absolute manner.
The United Kingdom War Crimes Act of 1991, for example, allows proceedings to be
brought against a person in the UK irrespective of his nationality at the time of the alleged
offence. This act applies in cases of murder, manslaughter, or culpable homicide committed
between September 1, 1935 until June 5, 1945, in circumstances where the accused was at
the time or has become a British citizen or resident of the UK, and the offence constituted
a violation of laws and customs of war.
4 1
40. For example, the plea to the jurisdiction of the Court (Commission) filed on behalf of all accused by the
defense alleging "in substance that the accused were German citizens and residents of China, and thus subject
only to Chinese law and the jurisdiction of Chinese courts." Id. Although it appears that the U.S. Commission
exercised absolute universal jurisdiction, because the defendants were residents and found on Chinese territory,
the Prosecutor attempted to justify the exercise of such extended jurisdiction based not only on the gravity of
the crime that violates the laws of nation, but also for another reason. He asserted that the Chinese Government
invited the U.S. to send troops to Chinese territory to wage war. "In view of this, the United States army
entered China as an allied expeditionary force with rights and privileges as well as the duties which are well
recognized in international law as attaching to such a force." Id. Thus, the United States has the right to punish
those "who violate the laws of war." Id. at 16. Moreover, the defendants had been initially captured in China.
SeeJordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-24 (2001).
41. Reprinted in MALCOLM EVANS, BLACKSTONE'S: INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 525 (5th ed. 2001); see
also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of InternalAtrocities, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 554, 573, n. 103 (1995)
(Article 7 of the Criminal Code of Canada 1985 allows exercise of universal jurisdiction, when "at the time of
the act or omission Canada could, in conformity with international law, exercise jurisdiction over the person
on the basis of the person's presence in Canada."). Moreover, section 8(b) of the Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes Act stipulates "[A person who is alleged to have committed an offence under section 6 or 7 may
be prosecuted for that offence if ... (b) after the time of the offence is alleged to have been committed, the
person is present in Canada," Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c.24, available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-45.9/40062.html (last updated Dec. 31, 2002). For a discussion regarding the
Canadian Act, see William A. Schabas, Canadian Implementing Legislation for the Rome Statute, 3 Y.B. 1NT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 337, 343-344 (2000); see also Bassiouni, supra note 32, at 142. See Reydams, infra note 93,
at 263, n.13 (a new article has been inserted in the Swiss Criminal Code, which entered into force December
15, 2000. Article 264 of the Swiss Criminal Code incorporates genocide as a crime under domestic law that is
subject to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by "civilian courts," however, such power is subject to the
presence of the suspect on the Swiss territory). See Brigitte Stern, International Decision: In re Javor, 93 AM. J.
IT'L L. 525 (1999). Likewise, article 689(2) of the French Criminal Procedure Code provides the basis for
universal jurisdiction, only if the accused is "found in France." Id. at 528. But in the re Javor case, Bosnian
victims "of the policy of ethnic cleansing" who were refugees in France filed a complaint "against their Serb
torturers" with an investigating magistrate. Id. at 525. They relied on universal jurisdiction. At the Tribunal
de grande instance, Judge Geti accepted both the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention as
"authorizing the French courts to decide this case involving foreign plaintiffs for acts committed abroad by
foreign defendants." Id. at 527. It is interesting to note that in interpreting article 689(2),Judge Getti adopted
a broad construction. He afforded it "some power [to apply] even when the accused is not on French territory."
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For example, articles 64, 64.6, and 65.1.2 of the Austrian Penal Code permit Austrian
courts to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over war crimes and torture. But, article
65.1.2 limits such application by requiring the presence of the accused in Austria.42
Thus, in the Cvjetkovic case, the accused was a Bosnian Serb who was arrested in Salzburg
on July 14, 1994, on the ground of committing genocide in Bosnia. He challenged the
legality of the arrest warrant on the grounds that Austrian courts lacked jurisdiction over
the case. The question was subsequently referred to the Austrian Supreme Court, which
held that Austrian courts were entitled to exercise jurisdiction over Cvjetkovic. On July 27,
1994, the District Court of Salzburg acquitted him for insufficient evidence. Although the
Austrian courts based its jurisdiction on the universality principle, the latter based its juris-
diction on article 65.1.2, which required the presence of the accused on the Austrian ter-
ritory. Indeed, the accused was arrested in Salzburg.
43
Furthermore, the Australian War Crimes Act 1945, as amended in 1988, requires a similar
rule to that of the aforementioned. In the Polyukhovich case, the Australian High Court
mentioned that the "universality principle ... permits jurisdiction to be exercised over a
limited category of offences on the basis that the offender is in the custody of the prose-
cuting state."4 Likewise, in the S.H.T case, the District Court of Haarlem (Netherlands)
Id. at 527. He considered that "all the acres dinstruction, that is, all the acts of preliminary inquiry, could be
undertaken even without the presence of the accused on French territory." Id. However, both the court of
appeals and the court of cassation rejected this interpretation by holding that, as long as the offender is not on
the French territory, universal jurisdiction cannot be exercised. Even the jurisdiction to try to ascertain the
offender whereabouts is not permissible. Moreover, the Court of cassation, while accepting the narrow type of
universality to Torture under article 689(2), disregarded it for the 1949 Geneva Conventions. She concluded
that although the conventions were ratified by France, no specific legislation to incorporate universal jurisdic-
tion has been enacted. Thus, they could not have a direct effect in the national legal system. Nevertheless,
Professor Stem argues that, unlike article 689-2, which explicitly requires the presence of the offender on the
French territory (for Torture) article 689 does not make any reference to such restriction. Thus, the court of
cassation could have relied on it with regard to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Id. at 528-29. In light of this
finding, it appears that even the French legislation seems to recognize universality in absentia. However, as
Professor Stem has observed, this case "illustrate[s] the reluctance of the French courts to assert universal
jurisdiction. This attitude is not a French exception, but is quite widespread." Id. at 529. But note Professor
Cassese's different opinion that mentioned that article 2 of the Law of January 2, 1995, implementing the
Statute of the ICTY regarding the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (grave breaches) required the
presence of the offender on the French territory. See ANTONiO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 286
(2003) [hereinafter CASSESE ICLI.
42. Redress, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, Annex: Law and Cases in Ten European Countries, Austria: Domestic
Legislation, available at http://www.redress.org/publications/annex.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2003) ("Article 64
of the Austrian Penal Code deals with offences which can be prosecuted in the Austrian courts even though
committed abroad . . . [Its application] is extended to specific listed offences (such as treason, kidnapping,
offences against the armed forces) and Article 64.4 adds [to those offences] other punishable criminal acts which
Austria is under an obligation to punish even when they have been committed abroad." These might include
the UN Convention Against Torture, and the [19491 Geneva Conventions. Article 65.1.2 provides that Austrian
criminal law may apply in respect of offences committed abroad, so long as the acts are also punishable in the
place where they are committed (double criminality), and provided, if a foreigner, is present in Austria and
cannot be extradited to the other state due to reasons other than the nature and characteristics of the offence.").
43. Id.
44. Polyukhovic v. Commonwealth of Australia, 91 INT'L L. REP. 1, 118 (1993) ("The accused, who had
become an Australian citizen after the Second World War, was charged with having committed war crimes
while serving in the German army in the Ukraine between 1942, 1943. These charges were brought under the
War Crimes Act 1945, and amended in 1988, which provided for the trial and punishment of persons who had
committed serious war crimes in Europe during the Second World War and who had entered Australia and
had become Australian citizens or residents after 1945. The Act therefore dealt with acts which had taken place
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applied article 7(4)(b) of the Dutch Penal Code, which limits the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction to the presence of the "offender" in the Netherlands.45
On the other hand, there exist other national laws that make it permissible to apply
absolute universal jurisdiction (in absentia) without the accused being physically present in
the state that is asserting jurisdiction. This different version of the universality principle is
upheld in Spain, Germany, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, and Israel.4 As their provisions
differ, I will limit my examination to the first three countries.
Professor Antonio Cassese argues that this version of the universality principle is "legally"
permissible for two reasons. First, given the gravity of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide, universal prosecution and repression is warranted. Second, because the ex-
ercise of this jurisdiction does not amount to a breach of the principle of sovereign equality
of states, as set out in article 2 (1) of the U.N. Charter, its application is permissible. 41 Indeed,
both the Trial and Appeals Chambers, in the Tadic case, adopted a similar view, namely,
when dealing with the most odious crimes of international concern, the sovereign rights of
states should not be invoked. The Tadic case stated:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept
of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights. Borders should
not be considered as a shield against the reach of the law and as a protection for those who
trample underfoot the most elementary rights of humanity...41
[T]he crimes which the International Tribunal has been called upon to try are not crimes of
a purely domestic nature. They are really crimes which are universal in nature, well recognized
in international law as serious breaches of international humanitarian law, and transcending
the interest of any one State. The Trial Chamber agrees that in such circumstances, the sov-
ereign rights of States cannot and should not take precedence over the right of the international
community to act appropriately as they affect the whole of mankind and shock the conscience
of all nations of the world... "
outside Australia and which had been committed by persons who were not at the time citizens or residents of
Australia. The Act required that the person to be charged must have become an Australian citizen or resident
by the time that he was charged.").
45. Public Prosecutor v. S.H.T., 74 INT'L L. REP. 162, 162-63 (1987). Although in the current case the
court dealt with terrorist acts as opposed to war crimes and crimes against humanity, it provides a good example
for the procedural requirements to exercise the universality principle at least with regard to hijacking crimes.
The accused, a resident of Jerusalem, was committed for trial in the Netherlands. He was charged together
with an accomplice for hijacking a British aircraft on a flight from Beirut to London and forcing the crew to
land at Schipol airport in the Netherlands. The main charge against the accused was based on article 385(a) of
the Dutch Penal Code, which implemented the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
of 1970, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971.
46. See Section 8, (l)(c)(iii) of the New Zealand International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act
2000, which permits that tspe of universality; with regard to Israel; see also Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. 121,
41 I.L.M. 536 (President's Separate opinion, para. 12); Yunis, supra note 29, at 348. Meanwhile, Professor
Cassese argues that article 7 of the Italian Code could be widely construed to that effect. However, Professor
Bassiouni's expressed a different opinion regarding article 7 of the Italian Criminal Code asserting that "Italy's
criminal code, Article 7, also provides for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but requires a nationality or
territorial connection." Bassiouni, s-upra note 32, at 144.
47. CAssEsE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 261-62 (2001). Cassese rightly limited such type ofuniversalityto the failure
of either the national state or the territorial state to take proceedings, CASSESE (ICL), supra note 41, at 287; see
also Curtis A. Bradley, UniversalJurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323 (2001) (noting that universal
jurisdiction does not require a nexus between "the regulating nation and the conduct, offender, or victim.").
48. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, 9 58 (1995).
49. Id. T 59; Prosecutorv. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995, 142.
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Based on this finding, it is arguable that when a state exercises universal jurisdiction by
default, it is hardly persuasive for any other state to claim a violation of article 2(1) of the
UN Charter. The state exercising that type of jurisdiction is not acting to merely protect
its own interest rather it's acting on behalf of the international community for the sake of
saving a common interest.
As mentioned previously, some countries applied the wider idea of universality, and thus,
extended their laws to cover extraterritorial acts committed by foreigners without any con-
nection between the offender, the offense, the victims, and the state asserting jurisdiction.
Those countries allow the application of universality by default or in absentia.
For example, article 23(4) of the Law on Judicial Powers of 1985 provides that "Spanish
courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed outside Spain when such crimes constitute
genocide, terrorism, or other crimes which Spain is obliged to prosecute under international
treaties."") Accordingly, it has been argued that the grave breaches may be prosecuted in
Spain regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the offender." The
requirement of a certain link between the offender and the state asserting jurisdiction is
not significant." The presence of the accused on the Spanish territory, however, is required
only for the actual passing of the sentence. 3 Although article 75(4)(e) of Additional Protocol
114 necessitates the presence of the accused for his trial and thus outlaws in absentia trials, it
does not seem to bar proceedings to be taken in the absence of the accused to guarantee
his presence to stand trial before the courts of the state asserting jurisdiction.' 5
50. See also CASSESE, supra note 47, at 206, 445; Jose-Luis Rodriguez et al., The Protection of War Victims
under the 1995 Spanish Penal Code: Offences Against Persons and Objects Protected in the Event ofArmed Conflict, in
NATIONAL MEASURES To REPRESS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS):
REPORT ON THE MEETING OF EXPERTS (GENEVA, 23-25 SEPTEMBER 1997) 287 (Christina Pelladini ed., 2000).
51. Rodriguez, supra note 50, at 287.
52. See Antonio Cassese, Wb'en May Senior State Officials Be Triedfor International Crimes? Some Comments
on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 853, 860 (2002). In this respect, Professor Cassese argues that
article 23(4) of the Spanish law of 1985 as amended in 1999 permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction in
absentia. However, see the recent decision rendered by the Spanish Supreme Court concerning the Guatemala
Genocide Case, where the Court restricted its interpretation of article 23(4) regarding the application of
universal jurisdiction under Spanish courts, to the existence of a connection with Spain, Spanish Supreme
Court: Guatemala Genocide Case [February 25, 2003] 42 I.L.M. 686, 699 (2003). But see the interesting
dissenting opinion written by Judges Garcia, Pallin, Tour6n, Chavarri, Garcia, Arrieta, and Ibanez, who con-
sidered that the Court erred in its interpretation of article 23(4). They argued that, "The requirement that the
offenders be located in Spanish territory [for the exercise of universal jurisdiction is misleading, since the Court
relied on a] series of International Conventions, none of which relate to genocide... [moreover] such treaties
normally establish certain international obligations in the exercise of jurisdiction..., which constitute an oblig-
atory minimum and not a maximum for this it cannot be concluded that there is a generic prohibition on the
exercise of universal jurisdiction over those responsible who are not located in national territory .... Id. at
707-08.
53. Rodriguez, supra note 50, at 287.
54. Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adopted June 8, 1977, entered into force December 7, 1978, 1125
U.N.T.S. 17512, art. 75(4)(e).
55. The Spanish law is compatible in this regard, since it does not allow trials in absentia. However, "initial
stages" could be taken "before a trial could commence." See Daniel Rothenberg, "Let Justice Judge": An Inter-
view with Judge Baltasar Garz'on and Analysis of His Ideas, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 924, 930 (2002). Thus, presumably
among those permitted initial stages, the initiation of arrest warrants to ensure the physical presence of the
person to stand trial. But, if the territorial state or the nationality state is acting or started acting, Spanish courts
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In May 1996, based on a complaint against General Pinochet and others, the Spanish
Judge Manuel Garcia agreed to investigate. Later, Judge Baltazar Garzon issued an arrest
warrant and a request for extradition of General Pinochet from London, where he was
obtaining medical treatment.16 He was arrested in a London clinic in October 1998.1' More-
over, in 1998 Judge Garzon issued an international arrest warrant for retired General Gal-
tieri and nine other Argentine officers to obtain their custody in Spain.5" Thus, according
to these warrants Spain exercised defacto universal jurisdiction in absentia within the meaning
of the Congo v. Belgium case.5 9
It is interesting to note that on November 1, 1998, another compliant was filed against
Pinochet in Belgium.- The Belgian Magistrate observed that by virtue of the 1993 War
Crimes Act, Belgian courts were competent to exercise universal jurisdiction over the al-
leged crimes. 6' Even in the absence of any link between the forum state and the perpetrator,
namely the voluntary presence of the accused on Belgian territory, Belgium could still assert
jurisdiction.6 This was a departure from the general rule set out in article 12 of the pre-
liminary title of the Code of Penal Procedure."' Despite the fact that the Belgian Magistrate
issued an arrest warrant for Pinochet, the Belgian Government failed to obtain his custody
because the British authorities released him on medical grounds. 64
should yield to them. In its ruling of December 13, 2000, in the case of Guatemalan Generals, the Audiencia
nacional affirmed this view when she "rejected a claim to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Spanish courts"
on the ground that the Guatemalan authorities could investigate and try them. CASSESE (ICL), supra note 41,
at 287.
56. Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1305 (1998) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet 1]; Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 311, 312 (2001).
57. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 56, at 311. Pinochet was arrested on October 23, 1998 based on the second
arrest warrant, which was issued on October 22, 1998. See Er Parte Pinochet I, supra note 56, at 1303.
58. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 56, at 311.
59. This does not deny the fact that there existed a link, namely that some victims were Spanish nationals.
However, Spain requested Pinochet's extradition based on the passive personality principle only with regard
to the first request. Nonetheless, in October, Judge Garzon issued a second international arrest warrant for
Pinochet based mainly on the broader ground of universality principle. See Antonio F. Perez, The Perils of
Pinocbet: Problems for Transitional Governance Solution, 28 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 191 (2000). The first
warrant was issued on October 16, 1998, while the second warrant was issued on October 22, 1998. See Regina
v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302; see also Rothenberg, supra note 55, at 936.
60. Luc Reydams, International Decision: Belgian Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels (investigatingmagistrate),
93 Am. J. Irr't L. 700 (1999) [hereinafter International Decision]. On November 1, 1998, a criminal complaint
was filed by "six Chilean exiles" against Pinochet. They alleged that during his presidency, he committed,
"crimes under international law" in Chile that are punishable under the Belgian statute implementing the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols thereto. Id.; see also Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2003).
61. See Belgian Law, Loi relative a la repression des infractions graves aux Conventions de Genbve du 12
aolst 1949 aux Protocoles I et 1I du 8 join 1977 ct (June 16, 1993), art. 7. This Complaint was filed before the
amendment of the Act in 1999.
62. Damien Vandermeersch, Belgian Legal System for the Repression of Crimes under International Law, in
Rodriguez, supra note 50, at 166-67; see also International Decision, supra note 60, at 701 (noting, "the magistrate
observed that the Belgian statute implementing the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols endows the
Belgian judicial authorities with universal jurisdiction and that it was the legislator's unambiguous intent that
the law should apply even when the alleged perpetrator is not present on Belgian territory."). Id.
63. Article 12 provides that jurisdiction of Belgian courts is restricted to the presence of the suspect in
Belgium. See Vandersmeersch, supra note 62, at 167.
64. Reydams, supra note 60. Even the Spanish extradition request was denied because Britain considered
that PINOCHET was "mentally unfit to stand trial." Major Christopher M. Supernor, International Bounty Hunters
for War Criminals: Privatizing the Enforcement of Justice, 50 A.F. L. REV. 215, 223 (2001).
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Section 6(9) of the German Penal Code refers to "Acts committed abroad which are
made punishable by the terms of an international treaty binding in the Federal Republic of
Germany.'' 6o Consequently, German courts are entitled to try international crimes covered
by those acts under the principle of universality.66 Although the German law and the tra-
ditional jurisprudence required the existence of a factual link for a German court to exercise
jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners,67 this view has recently been re-
versed. In the Sokolovic case, the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) opposed the
early finding of the Court of Appeal with regard to the requirement of a 'factual link' and
upheld the principle that universal jurisdiction does not require any link between Germany,
the crime, the offender, or the victim. 6 The court stated, "[t]he Court however inclines, in
any case under Article 6, paragraph 9 of the German Criminal Code, not to hold as
necessary these additional factual links that would warrant the exercise of jurisdiction."6 9
65. Cassese, supra note 52, at 861, n.22.
66. Horst Fischer, National Systems to Repress Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in Rodriguez, supra
note 50, at 78.
67. Id; CASSESE, supra note 47, 445, n.63; see also Sascha Rolf Luder, The Repression of Violations of international
Humanitarian Law under German Domestic Law, in Pellandini, supra note 50, at 247-48.
68. Cassese, supra note 52, at 861. "[Tihe Court noted that in its decision of 29 November 1999 that the
Court of Appeal, following the traditional German case law, had held that a factual link was required by law
for a German court to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad by foreigners (in the case at issue
the offender was a Bosnian Serb accused of complicity in genocide perpetrated in Bosnia). The court of appeal
had found this factual link in the fact that the accused had lived and worked in Germany from 1969 to 1989
and had thereafter regularly returned to Germany to collect his pension and also to seek work." However,
after recalling these findings, the Supreme Court found that the factual link is not significant and thus, its
absence does not bar German courts from exercising absolute universal jurisdiction. However, see WVirth's
different opinion that mentions that under German Law trials in absentia are not permitted. Thus, presumably
his interpretation of the new CCIL (infra notes 71-75) leads to the conclusion that only initiating proceedings
including issuing international arrest warrants is the only permissible type of universality in absentia; Steffen
Wirth, Germany's New International Crimes Code: Bringing a Case to Court, I J. INr'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE (JICJ)
152, 160, 164 (2003).
See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 79 INT'L L. REP. 535 (1985). The facts of this case, as well, may reflect an exercise
of universal jurisdiction in absentia. The accused John Demjanjuk a "native of the USSR" and a resident of the
United States, was charged of having murdered "tens of thousands of Jews and non-Jews" during his service
in the SS at the Treblinka concentration camp in Poland during Vorld War II. Israel issued an arrest warrant
which later was the ground for requesting his extradition from the United States, pursuant to the 1950 Nazis
and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law. No link existed between Israel and the offences or the offender,
and the United States Court of Appeal realized this fact when stating "[A] state's courts may exercise jurisdiction
to enforce the state's criminal laws which punish universal crimes or other non-territorial offenses within the
state's jurisdiction to prescribe. Israel is seeking to enforce its criminal law for the punishment of Nazis and
Nazi collaborators for crimes universally recognized and condenned by the community of nations." Id. at 545.
"The courts of Israel had jurisdiction to try Demjanjuk, even though he had never been a citizen of Israel."
Id. at 536. "[T]he fact that [he] is charged with committing these acts in Poland does not deprive Israel of
authority to bring him to trial... When proceeding on [universal jurisdiction] premise, neither the nationality
of the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that
the crimes are offenses against the law of nations or against humanity and that the prosecuting nation is acting
for all nations. This is being so, Israel or any other nation, regardless of its status in 1942 or 1943, may undertake
to vindicate the interest of all nations by seeking to punish the perpetrators of such crimes." Id. at 545-46.
However, Professor Bassioni's different opinion considers that although "the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit referred to universal jurisdiction over crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity,
[it] relied [however] on the same Israeli law that was based on the theory of passive personality." See Bassiouni,
supra note 32, at 138.
69. Sokolovic Case, supra note 22, at 20. The original German text reads: "Der Senat neigt jedoch dazu,
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The court found that universal jurisdiction in absentia was permitted in some instances
when it ruled on a sensitive legal issue stating, "when Germany prosecutes and punishes
under German law an offence committed by a foreigner abroad, it is difficult to speak of
an infringement of the principle of non-intervention," provided that Germany is under a
duty to prosecute by virtue of an international treaty.70 This conclusion finds its way in the
new German Code of Crimes Against International Law (Voelkerstrafgesetzbuch, CCIL).2'
OnJune 30, 2002, the CCIL entered into force.7 2 Section 1 permits the exercise of universal
jurisdiction to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, despite the fact that the
offences have no specific link to Germany." Accordingly, Professor Gerhard Werle, argues
that the "deviating jurisprudence" which set out the requirement of "the additional link to
Germany" has no standing for the application of the CCIL.1
4
Nevertheless, although the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction is broad, it is not without
limitations or suitable guidelines to avoid or reduce its danger. Some modifications to the
German Code of Criminal Procedure have been made. Section 153(o has been inserted
and provides the prosecutor with full discretion to decide whether or not to prosecute
"where the crime has been committed abroad by a non-German national against a non-
German national and where the offender is neither present on German territory nor ex-
pected to enter German territory."7 In sum, Germany has taken positive steps that inevi-
tably contribute to the development of the idea of absolute universality.
jedenfalls bei § 6 Nr. 9 StGB, solche zusitzlichen legitimierenden Anknipfungstatsachen firnichterforderlich
zu halten," available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2003); see also Cassese, supra note
47, at 445, n.63; Cassese, supra note 52, at 861, n.22.
70. Sokolovic Case, supra note 22, at 20. The original text reads as follows: '"Venn nimlich die Bundesre-
publik Deutschland in Erfiillung einer volkerrechtlich bindenden, aufgrund eines zwischenstaatlichen Abkom-
mens oibernommenen Verfolgungspflicht die Auslandstat eines Auslinders an Auslindern verfolgt und nach
deutschem Strafrecht ahndet, kann schwerlich von einem Verstofi gegen das Nichteinmischungsprinzip die
Rede sein." Id; see also Cassese, supra note 47, at 445, n.63; Cassese, supra note 52, 861, n.22.
71. Gerhard Werle & Florian Jessberger, International Criminal Justice is Coming Home: The New German
Code of Crimes Against International Law, 13 CRos. L.F. 191 (2002).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 201.
74. Id. at n.49.
75. Id. at 213. Section 153(0 stipulates: "(1) In the cases referred to under Section 153c subsection (1),
numbers I and (2), the public prosecution may dispense with prosecuting an offence punishable pursuant to
sections 6 to 14 of the Code of Crimes against International Law, if the accused is not present in Germany
and such presence is not to be anticipated. If in the cases referred to under Section 153c subsection (1), number
1, the accused is a German, this shall however apply only where the offence is being prosecuted before an
international court or by a State on whose territory the offence was committed or whose national was harmed
by the offence. (2) In the cases referred to under Section 153c subsection (1), numbers I and (2), the public
prosecution office may dispense with prosecuting an offence punishable pursuant to sections 6 to 14 of the
Code of Crimes against International Law, in particular if
1. there is no suspicion of a German having committed such offence, 2. such offence was not committed
against a German, 3. no suspect in respect of such offence is residing in Germany and such residence
is not to be anticipated and 4. the offence is being prosecuted before an international court or by a
State on whose territory the offence was committed, whose national is suspected of its commission
or whose national was harmed by the offence. The same shall apply if a foreigner accused of an
offence committed abroad is residing in Germany but the requirements pursuant to the first sen-
tence, numbers 2 and 4, have been fulfilled and transfer to an international court or extradition to
the prosecuting state is permissible and is intended. (3) If in the cases referred to under subsection
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Based on the foregoing, one may conclude that while universal jurisdiction in absentia is
excluded under some legal systems, it is permissible under others. Thus, the question
whether such practice is prohibited remains unresolved.
In her dissenting opinion in the Congo v. Belgium case, Professor Van Den Wyngaert
argued that because of the diversity of state practice and national systems regarding that
type of jurisdiction, the existence of a barring rule of "customary international law" was
lacking. She made her point in the following words:
There is no customary international law to this effect either. The Congo submits there is a State
practice, evidencing an opinio juris asserting that universal jurisdiction, per se, requires the
presence of the offender on the territory of the prosecuting State. Many national systems giving
effect to the obligation aut dedere autjudicare and/or the Rome Statute for an International
Criminal Court indeed require the presence of the offender. This appears from legislation and
from a number of national decisions .... However, there are also examples of national systems
that do not require the presence of the offender on the territory of the prosecuting State.
Governments and national courts in the same State may hold different opinions on the same
question, which makes it even more difficult to identify the opiniojuris in that State.76
Furthermore, even the practice of states to abstain from initiating proceedings in absentia
or to choose to initiate proceedings in the presence of the accused, did not lead to the
conclusion that such practice was contrary to international law." This might be due to
other "practical" or "political" considerations."
Moreover, the Lotus case, examined by the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), is instructive and as mentioned by Professor Van Den Wyngaert "not only an au-
thority on jurisdiction, but also on the formation of customary international law."7 9 In that
case, the court tested the extraterritorial scope of a country's criminal law and concluded that:
According to international law, the jurisdiction of States was territorial in the sense that, failing
the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary, a State must not exercise its power in any
form in the territory of another State. But from that it does not follow that international law
prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its territory in regard to acts committed abroad.
Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States
to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property
and acts outside their territory .... But this is certainly not the case under international law
as it stands at present.55
(1) or (2) public charges have already been preferred, the public prosecution office may withdraw
the charges at any stage of the proceedings and terminate the proceedings."
Id. at Appendix 222-23. It should be noted that sections 6 to 14 referred to in the above text covers the three
crimes, in addition to the command responsibility. It is interesting to note that section 153(0(2) seems to offer
a solution for the problem that might arise in cases of conflict of jurisdiction between states. This is one of the
major problems of universality in absentia. However, this amendment seems to offer a valid solution to reduce
such danger by leaving room for the dismissal of cases in the situation where any of the International, territorial,
or the national state courts of the accused and the victim are acting.
76. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 1, ' 55 (Judge Van Den Wyngaert Dissenting Opinion).
77. Id. 1 13.
78. Id.
79. Id. q 56.
80. Annual Digest, 1927-1928, Case No. 98, at 155-56. Thus, the water mark here is as long as a state has
not exercised jurisdiction into the territory of another state (enforcement jurisdiction) or exercised such juris-
diction without the consent of that state, there is no other restrictive rule under international law that bar a
state from exercising jurisdiction in its territory over acts committed abroad.
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Thus, a state must not exercise absolute or universal jurisdiction in absentia where there is
a "general" prohibitive rule under international law to that effect. To determine the exis-
tence of such a prohibitive or restrictive rule, "it is necessary [as Cowles mentioned] to
show that States generally, as a matter of practice expressing a rule of law, have consented
not to exercise [such type of] jurisdiction ... As independent States are involved, any such
restriction must be conclusively proved, and to do this municipal law and practice must not
be divided"'" and if "municipal jurisprudence [is] divided, it is hardly possible to see in it
an indication of the existence of the restrictive rule of international law." 2 Based on this
conclusion, one may argue that because the municipal jurisprudence and laws of various
countries are divided, in regard to this issue, international law lacks the restrictive rule that
bans the exercise of absolute universality.
Nevertheless, some commentators disregard the validity of Lotus as too liberal with no
precedential value. This may be because the rules regulating the formation of custom have
slightly changed. The previously prevailing idea, that the "tacit" agreement or "consent of
all states" is required for a rule of customary law to emerge is no longer tenable.,3 It is
sufficient for a majority of states to engage in a consistent practice corresponding with the
rule 4 and accepting it as legally binding.8 The ICJ confirmed this viewpoint in the case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, when it stated:
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary the corresponding
practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. .. the Court deems it sufficient
that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances
of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches
of that rule, not as indication of the recognition of a new rule.16
81. Willard B. Cowles, Universality of lurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177, 181 (1945).
82. PCIJ, 1927, Series A, No. 10, at 29. See also Cowles, supra note 81, at 180. However, see Shaw's different
opinion, citing to the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and the Notnebohm cases, where he considers that the liberal
rule set out in the Lotus case does not stand anymore. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 460-61 (4th
ed. 2001).
83. Cassese, supra note 47, at 123; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (5th
ed. 2001).
84. Cassese, supra note 47, at 123.
85. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1993).
86. I.CJ. Reports, 1986, at 98; but see Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
July 8, 1996, 9J 71, 73, available at http://ww.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunanframe.htm. The Court
noted that the diversity of opinions impeded the determination of the rule of customary law prohibiting the
use or threat of nuclear weapons as follows:
Examined in their totality, the General Assembly resolutions put before the Court declare that the use
of nuclear weapons would be 'a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations'; and in certain
formulations that such use 'should be prohibited'. The focus of these resolutions has some times shifted
to diverse related matters; however, several of the resolutions under consideration in the present case
have been adopted with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions; thus, although those
resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they still fall
short of establishing the existence of an opiniojuris on the illegality of the use of such weapons.. .The
emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such
is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opiniojuris on the one hand, and the still
strong adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other.
Id.; see also RODNEY DiXON ET AL., ARCHBOLD: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE 8 (2003) (noting that it is "necessary to consider whether there are divergent views and conduct in
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Thus, one may wonder whether current national legislation, case law, and opiniojuris that
discounts absolute jurisdiction are sufficient grounds for the formation of a custom or a
restrictive rule."'
V. The Codification of the Doctrine of Universal
Jurisdiction under the 1949 Geneva Conventions
The late 1940s saw the creation of a new series of treaties that codified the use of universal
jurisdiction over war crimes "treating the [doctrine] as an accepted feature of customary
international law.""a These are the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Articles 49,89 50,90 129,91 146,912 common to the four Geneva Conventions, impose a duty
upon the States to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere aut judicaire) perpetrators of grave
breaches of international humanitarian law through a mechanism of "mandatory universal
jurisdiction." 3 These provisions oblige state parties to the Geneva Conventions to under-
take enactment of any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
State practice-the inquiry must not be limited to those States that support the rule of customary law."). Id.
Based on the aforementioned wording, one may therefore argue that the diversity of opinion regarding
universality in absentia supports the conclusion that a customary rule prohibiting its application is lacking.
87. As Villiger has rightly observed, the "fluid and dynamic nature of customary law makes it difficult to
asses in abstracto at what point State practice and the opinio give rise to a rule." MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW .ND TREATIES 194 (1985).
88. Morris, supra note 31, at 346; see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization oflnternalAtrocities,
89 AM. J. INrT'L L. 554, 572 (1995).
89. 1949 Geneva Conventions: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
90. 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
91. 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
135.
92. 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted Aug.
12, 1948, entered into Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
93. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Oct. 2, 1995, 9 80; Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic" et al.,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Nov. 16, 1998, 9] 200 (noting that "[t]he system of mandatory universal jurisdiction
over those offenses described as 'grave breaches' of the Conventions requires all States to prosecute or extradite
alleged violators of the Conventions."); see also Horst Fischer, The Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS: COMMENTARY 73 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald et al. eds., 2000); Bartram S.
Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International Humanitarian Law, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 392-93
(1998); L.C. Green, 'Grave Breaches' or Crimes Against Humanity, 8 U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY J. LEGAL STUDIES
19, 27-29 (1997); Sonja Boelaert Suominen, Grave Breaches, Universal jurisdiction and InternalArmed Conflict:
Is Customary Law Moving Towards a Uniform Enforcement Mechanism for All Armed Conflicts? 5 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 63, 71 (2000); Mary O'Connell, Symposium Method in international Law: New International Legal
Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 341 (1999); Luc Reydams, Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, Tribunal Militaire de
Cassation (Swiizerland), April 27, 2001, 96 A.M. J. INT'L L. 231 (2002). Despite the fact that this case reflects the
application of universal jurisdiction where the accused was present in Switzerland, it is worth mentioning as
set out below. In the Niyonteze case, the Swiss Tribunal militaire de cassation is considered the first municipal
court to render a conviction based on universal jurisdiction under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II in an internal armed conflict. After crimes were committed and the government forces defeated
during the armed conflict between the government forces and the rebel army of Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF),
which took place from April to July 1994, Mr. Fulgence Niyonteze and his family fled to Switzerland, where
he was arrested. The ICTR did not request deferral, while Rwanda requested his extradition, but to no avail.
Id.
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committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the "grave breaches" defined in the con-
ventions. More importantly, each party "shall be under an obligation to search for [those]
persons alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches,
and shall bring them before its own courts." This is true regardless of their nationality.
Should a state party decide not to try any of those persons, it is under an obligation to
extradite them to another state party for trial, provided that the latter "has made out aprima
facie case."
Paragraph 2, common to the aforementioned four Geneva Conventions, is the key to the
mechanism of repression through the concept of universality of jurisdiction. A literal read-
ing of the text of paragraph 2 suggests that every state is under a duty to search, arrest, and
try those who commit any of the "grave breaches" set out in the conventions, regardless of
any link between the perpetrator and the state asserting jurisdiction. Furthermore, it could
be argued that the wide language used by the drafters, "shall be under an obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed ... such grave breaches," supports the prop-
osition that every state party is obligated not only to search for those perpetrators, but also
to arrest them wherever they might be found. Obviously, this could be achieved through
the issuance of an international arrest warrant accompanied by an extradition request, which
would be enforced by the authorities of the state where the accused is present. In addition,
while the wording of the text supports the application of universal jurisdiction generally, it
does not include any language that precludes its application by default. In its advisory
opinion on the reservations to the genocide convention, the ICJ stated:
[I]n this state of international practice, it could certainly not be inferred from the absence of
an article providing for reservations in a multilateral convention that the Contracting States
are prohibited from making certain reservations ... The character of a multilateral convention,
its purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption, are factors which must be consid-
ered in determining, in the absence of any express provision on the subject, the possibility of
making reservations.
9 4
In a parallel line of argument, it cannot be inferred from the absence of a specific article
or explicit language providing for absolute universal jurisdiction that the parties are pro-
hibited from applying it. Indeed, the language used in the Geneva Conventions requires
the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The only problem, however, is that the text is silent
regarding the method of application. An examination of the humanitarian character, beyond
the Geneva Conventions and their purposes, reflects that a highly effective system of re-
pression was required and intended by the drafters. 9s Accordingly, one cannot hold a view
that the Geneva Conventions do not allow states to exercise absolute universal jurisdiction.
94. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,
1951 I.CJ Rep. 15, 22 (May 28, 1951).
95. See, e.g., Rejavor, supra note 41 (expressing the opinions of Professor Claude Lombois and Brigitte Stern
regarding the interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions); Meron, supra note 88, at 570. Judge Meron
stresses the main purposes and objects of the Conventions and the legal consequences that might result from
not acting inconformity with them, by saying: "[Given the purposes and objects of the Geneva Conventions
and the normative content of their provisions, any state that does not have the necessary laws in place, or is
otherwise unwilling to prosecute and punish violators of clauses other than the grave breaches provisions that
are significant and have a clear penal character, calls into serious question its good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations." Id.; see also Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, 16 MiCH. J. INT'L L. 783, 792-93 (1995) (noting that there are several arguments that support the
mechanism of universal jurisdiction for grave breaches). These arguments demonstrate that "there was an
apparent need to foster respect for the Conventions and to ensure their efficient implementation. Grave
VOL. 37, NO. 3
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN ABSENTIA 853
Although Pictet argues that states are under a duty to arrest perpetrators of grave breaches
only when found on their territory96 and, therefore, universality by default would be im-
permissible under the Geneva Conventions, this strict interpretation 97 can no longer ac-
commodate the development of international law and the pressing need to suppress the
increased number of gross violations that have taken place during the last few decades. This
view has been upheld in an early advisory opinion of the ICJ regarding Namibia, when the
court stated, "[i]nterpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of
law,... Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation. '"98
On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) adopts a similar
approach of interpretation by applying the "principle of effectiveness." The latter principle,
as Professor Merrills argues, is a means "to interpret [a treaty] in a way which gives its
provisions a maximum of effectiveness, having regard to its language and its object and
purpose." 99
Thus, in the early Airey case and in the recent, Mamatkulov, Ocalan, and Loizidou cases,
the ECHR made a reference to the principle of effectiveness when stating, "the Convention
must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions. . ."10 This evolutionary inter-
pretation is consistent with the underlying character and goals of the aforementioned Ge-
neva Conventions that face critical situations subject to continuous development. 0
Thus, applying the above principles to the text of the Geneva Conventions leads to the
conclusion that the practice of absolute universal jurisdiction is consistent with the spirit
of those conventions. Although the four common provisions set out in the Geneva Con-
ventions, and similar provisions in other treaties, are based on the principle of aut dedere
breaches were given a special place in the Conventions in order to prevent such acts from going unpunished."
Id. If this is the underlying premise of those Conventions, then one might wonder why an exercise of universality
by default should not be allowed in specific cases to avoid "such acts from going unpunished."
96. Commentary on Geneva Convention IV, art. 146, at 578; but see Amnesty International, Universal
Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation, Ch. 1., 2001, at 14 (noting that the Geneva
Conventions do not require any link between the state exercising jurisdiction and the accused.). On the basis
of that jurisdiction a prosecutor or an investigating judge may commence an investigation, gather evidence,
issue international arrest warrants, and file extradition requests where a state is unwilling or unable to act. Id.
97. Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights,
42 GERMAN Y.B. Irr'L L. 11, 14 (1999). It seems that the demand to preserve states national sovereigntyplayed
a major role in Pictet's strict interpretation to the abovementioned provisions. However, as Judge Bernhardt
has rightly mentioned: "the principle that treaties should be interpreted restrictively and in favor of State
sovereignty, in dubio mitius. . . is no longer relevant... Treaty obligations are in case of doubt and in principle
not to be interpreted in favor of State sovereignty. It is obvious that this conclusion can have considerable
consequences for human rights conventions: Every effective protection of individual freedoms restricts State
sovereignty." Id. In a same line of argument the fight against impunity in the sake of effective protection of
individual human rights may permit a limitation or restriction on state sovereignty.
98. 1971 I.CJ. at 31.
99. J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 97 (1990).
100. Series A. No. 32, 26; Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, (Merits) App. No., 00046827/99,
Judgment Feb. 6, 2003, T 94 ; Ocalan v. Turkey, (Merits), App. No. 00046221/99, Judgment Mar. 12, 2003,
9 193; Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), App. No., 0001531/89, Mar. 23, 1995, T9 71-72 Tyrer
Case, Series A. No. 26, $ 31. Minelli Case, Series A. No. 62; Artico Case, Series A. No. 37; Klass Case, Series
A. N. 28.
101. Deborah Mangion, Article 3 of the ECHR: Relative Interpretations ofa Universal Right? 6 MEDITERRANEAN
J. HUM. RTs. 247, 251 (2002).
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autjudicaire, which normally envisages the presence of the accused on the territory of the
state asserting jurisdiction, this conclusion "cannot be interpreted a contrario so as to exclude
a voluntary exercise of universal jurisdiction."' °2 Thus, as mentioned in the joint separate
opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, in the Congo case, "if the under-
lying purpose of designating certain acts as an international crimes is to authorize a wide
jurisdiction to be asserted over persons committing them, there is no rule of international
law (and certainly not the aut dedere principle) which makes illegal co-operative overt acts
designed to secure their presence within a State wishing to exercise jurisdiction.""' Hence,
according to their conclusion, universal jurisdiction in absentia is not forbidden.
VI. The ICJ's Approach toward Absolute Universality
As mentioned previously in section 1, the ICJ did not address the question of universality
in absentia and, therefore, as Professor Cassese pointed out, the court missed "a golden
opportunity to cast light on a difficult and topical legal issue.""' 4 Some of the judges,
however, tackled this significant issue in their separate opinions and reached different
conclusions.
President Guillaume vigorously opposed the idea of universal jurisdiction to all heinous
crimes with the exception of piracy.0 He asserted moreover that international law did not
recognize what is known as universality in absentia."°6 His argument was based on the
grounds that neither treaties that entail the duty to prosecute or extradite, nor customary
international law, recognize jurisdiction in the absence of the offender in the prosecuting
state at the time of initiating procedures against him. 0 7 Instead, he cited various treaties
that embody the rule of aut dedere autjudicare that requires only the state where the person
is found, to either prosecute or hand over the accused to another state for prosecution.'
"None of [the mentioned treaties] has contemplated establishing jurisdiction over offences
committed abroad by foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the territory of the
State in question." °9
But, the fact that the listed conventions require the voluntary presence of the perpetrator
on the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction does not mean that the general practice
of universality in absentia is outlawed.'' 0 It should not be forgotten that the grave breach
102. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 9 57 (Opinions ofJudges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
103. Id. 9 58.
104. Cassese, supra note 52, at 856.
105. See Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 9 16 (stating President Guillaume's Separate Opinion).
106. Id. 91 12-13; see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, International Decision: Arrest Warrant of I I April2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 677, 681 (2002) (supporting Judge Guil-
laume's opinion).
107. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 9 13 (President Guillaume's Separate Opinion).
108. Id. 9 7-9.
109. Id. 19.
110. See, e.g., Clark's early article where he does not preclude the possibility of universality in absentia. He
said: "one of the dangers of conceding universal jurisdiction that is sometimes mentioned is that states will try
officials of another state in absentia, for political reasons. [The provision of article V of the Apartheid Conven-
tion], at least does not legitimate trials held in the absence of the accused. The sparse material on this point
concerning this and other treaties certainly does not support a general proposition that trial in absentia is
inappropriate in respect of other crimes of international concern. The point is simply not developed." Roger
S. Clark, Offenses of International Concern: Multilateral State Treaty Practice in the Forty Years Since Nuremberg,
57 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 49, 93, n.60 (1988); see also The Princeton Principles, which states in Principle I(1): "For
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provisions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions do not beg such requirement and, therefore,
could be interpreted in an effective manner or a broad sense, as previously demonstrated
in Section 1.5, and would not require such restriction."' This conclusion is in line with
Professor's Brigitte Stern's finding that stated:
The Universality principle is generally understood as giving jurisdiction to a state for acts
committed by foreigners anywhere in the world, merely on the basis of the perpetrator being
in that state's territory. This is an unduly limited interpretation of what universal jurisdiction
should be, however. If such a territorial link is required, real universal jurisdiction is not being
exercised." 2
Furthermore, President Guillaume's assertion that the principle of universal jurisdiction
is limited to piracy clearly contradicts the finding of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case,
in which it affirmed the early finding of the Italian Supreme Military Tribunal in the case
of General Wagener stating:
mhe solidarity among nations, aimed at alleviating in the best possible way the horrors of
war, gave rise to the need to dictate rules which do not recognize borders, punishing criminals
wherever they may be ... Crimes against the laws and customs of war ... are ... crimes of
lise-humaniti (reati di lesa umanita) and, ...the norms prohibiting them have a universal
character, not simply a territorial one. Such crimes ... concern all civilised States, and are to
be opposed and punished, in the same way as the crimes of piracy. ..13
The finding of this chamber that the punishment for some crimes "need to dictate rules
which do not recognize borders," . .. [and] ("Such crimes, . . . are to be opposed and
punished, in the same way as the crimes of piracy") makes it clear that universal jurisdiction
is neither limited to the crime of piracy nor should be narrowed or restricted in its appli-
cation. Thus, universality in absentia is justified.
President Guillaume found no ground for this type of jurisdiction under state practice
or customary law. In so doing, he cited to the French, Dutch, and German legislations as
valid examples to support his viewpoint." 4 Despite these arguments, this conclusion is
hardly persuasive. It is true that the French"' and Dutch systems do not recognize absolute
the purposes of these Principles, universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator,
the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising jurisdiction. Principle 2(1)....
serious crimes under international law include: (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes against peace;
(5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture." See Neil Boister, The ICJ in the Belgian Arrest
Warrant Case: arresting the Development of lnternational Criminal Law, 7 J. oF CONFLICT & SECURIrv LAw 293,
311 (2002).
111. But, President Guillaume's opinion argues that even the common provisions of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions require the presence of the accused on the territory of the arresting state. See Congo v. Belgium Case,
supra note 1, 1 17.
112. Brigitte Stern, Better Interpretation and Enforcement of Universality ofyurisdiction, 14 NoUVELLEs ESTUDES
PENALES 175, 185 (1998); see also Judge Higgins' opinion regarding the meaning of universal jurisdiction. Her
apparent opinion seems to suggest that true universal jurisdiction does not require any nexus whatsoever.
HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, supra note 15, at 64-65.
113. Tadic Case, supra note 22, ' 57 (quoting an earl), judgment of the Italian Supreme Military Tribunal
Mar in Rivista Penale 753, 757 (Sup. Mil. Trib., Mar. 13, 1950)).
114. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, ' 12 (President Guillaume's opinion).
115. But see Stem, supra note 41, at 528-29 (stating that article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
leaves room for the applicability of universality in absentia).
FALL 2003
856 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
universality (in absentia). But, along the same line of argument, it does not follow from this
conclusion that the practice is generally prohibited under international law. Still, there exists
other laws such as the Spanish, Belgium (however is currently under amendments as seen
in the conclusion), Italian, New Zealand, and Israeli legislations that recognize the type of
universality in absentia as mentioned previously in section 1.4. Moreover, it is undeniable
that in the past German courts have restricted the exercise of universal jurisdiction under
section 6, paragraphs 1 and 9 to the presence of a "factual link" between Germany and the
offender. This view, however, does not stand anymore, as the Federal Supreme Court re-
versed it recently in the Sokolovic case. 1 6 In addition, section 1 of the new CCIL evidences
that a new trend has emerged that favors universality in absentia."7
Aside from the aforementioned arguments, it is worth noting that heinous crimes, such
as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide are part ofjus cogens. As a result, all
states have an obligation erga omnes to repress these crimes and combat impunity by all
legal means including universal jurisdiction."' To outlaw a highly legal mechanism that
contributes in the repression of those odious crimes might rise to a violation of ajus cogens
norm. One cannot believe, for example, that a state that initiates proceedings by issuing an
international arrest warrant accompanied by an extradition request to subsequently secure
the presence of the offender would be in violation of international law. It should be seen
as an effective type of cooperation between all states in order to fight those crimes that
shock the conscious of not only one state, but humanity as a whole." 9 Professor Brigitte
Stern expressed a similar view when she stated:
116. See supra notes 67-70.
117. See supra notes 71-75; see also Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, $ 20 (stating the joint separate
opinion of judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Burgenthal regarding the initial proposal for this Code).
118. A. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES, VOl. , 46 (Ardsley, New York: Trans-
national Publishers, 1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of
Fundamental Human Rigtbs: International Crimes: ]us Cogens and Obligation Erga Omnes, 14 NOUVELLES ESTUDES
PENALES 133 (1998); see also, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3,
32 (Feb. 5, 1970). The ICJ defined the concept of" erga omnes" and its legal effect towards the entire community
in the following terms:
[AJn essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection.
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.
See also Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.CJ. 4, 27-33, $ 33 (July 11, 1996). The ICJ expressed itself
regarding obligations erga omnes in the following words: "The Court is of the view that it follows from the
object and purpose of the Convention that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights
and obligations erga omnes." Id. This wording emphasizes that the Convention imposes an obligation erga omnes
to punish and prevent the crime of genocide. Id. at 25.
119. See, e.g., G.A. Res., U.N. GADR 2840 (XXVI), adopted 1971, which stipulates that: "[A state's refusal]
to co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons accused of war crimes and crimes
against humanity is contrary to the United Nations Charter and to generally recognized norms of international
law." Despite the fact that GA Resolutions are considered soft law and thus, do not create other than moral
obligations, "it does at least suggest [as Prof. Stern has validly pointed] the right to act in accordance with such
a resolution." Stern, supra note 112, at 181-82. It follows that any denial of cooperation on the part of a State
for the sake of arresting a war criminal might place that state in violation of international law norms. However,
see Reydams different opinion who considers that "[t]he proposition that the presence of the accused can be
self-generated through extradition is ... untenable both from the perspective of the rights of the States and
from the perspective of human rights." Reydams, supra note 21, at 815.
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In state's efforts to bring a perpetrator into its custody, all legal devices should be used. Es-
pecially in this period where civil society is often at the root of positive changes, all possibilities
available to set in motion the prosecution of international crimes should be encouraged...
Universal jurisdiction must always imply some rights of research on the perpetrator in order to
bring him into that state's territory ... search for, and apprehended persons charged with
international crimes under universal jurisdiction cannot be contested. 2 0
In contrast to President Guillaume's opinion, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergen-
thai hold the view that absolute universal jurisdiction is permissible under international law,
despite the variations in national legislation, case law, and opiniojuris.'2' But such permis-
sibility is subject to the following five conditions: 2 (1) a State that demands to initiate
criminal proceedings must first offer to the national State of the prospective accused person
the opportunity to act upon the charges concerned; (2) charges may only be brought by a
prosecutor or investigating judge in order to ensure independence of the government;
(3) commencement of legal proceedings are subject to a complaint to the prosecutor or the
investigating judge filed by the person concerned; (4) the alleged crimes must be regarded
as the most heinous by the international community; and (5) jurisdiction cannot be exercised
as long as the prospective accused is a foreign minister in office. After he leaves office,
jurisdiction may be exercised over private acts.
These prerequisites are well constructed. The first requirement, however, poses some
interesting questions. The three judges mentioned that the state initiation of criminal pro-
ceedings should first give the national state of the accused the opportunity to act. But the
reason for choosing the state of nationality of the accused and not the territorial state or
the state of which the victim is a national is not clear. Nonetheless, a close reading of
paragraph 59 of the joint separate opinion suggests two distinct conclusions. First, the
judges examined this issue in a strict sense, namely with regard to state officials as opposed
to civilians or other state agents who are not immune. This conclusion is supported on
several grounds. Under international law only the sending state, which in this case is the
national state of the accused (diplomatic agent), has the competence to waive the immunity
over its diplomatic agents. 2 ' Moreover, international law does not grant diplomatic agents
immunity from criminal jurisdiction in their own countries, which signifies that they could
be tried before the domestic courts of those countries.2 4 Finally, to save international re-
lations between states, it deems necessary to offer the national state of the accused the
opportunity to act. The sum of these reasons makes it more plausible to offer the national
state of the accused the opportunity to prosecute. Consequently, it is not possible to make
reference to either the territorial state or the nationality of the victim. This conclusion is
conceivable, but only when dealing with situations that involve diplomatic agents. It is
hardly persuasive to reach the same conclusion when dealing with civilians, because it would
120. Stern, supra note 112, at 180-82.
121. Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 45, 54 (stating the joint separate opinion of judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Burgenthal). See aSO Judge Koroma's Opinion that mentioned the judgment "cannot be seen
either as a rejection of the principle of universal jurisdiction." It is available to certain crimes, such as war
crimes and crimes against humanity, genocide, and slave trade. The Court, however, did not rule on it because
it was not indispensable to do so to reach its conclusion, nor was such submission before it. Id. 1 9.
122. Id. It 59-60, 79-85.
123. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, art. 32; Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1,
59.
124. Id. art. 31(4); Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, 1 61.
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not appear necessary to restrict such offer to the state of nationality of the accused as the
case with diplomatic agents. The same question seems to be unresolved with regard to non-
diplomatic agents, and thus the reason why the offer should be directed to the state of
nationality of the accused and not the territorial or the state of nationality of the victim?
The three judges provided no guidance to this question. If such an offer is deemed necessary
in the case of diplomatic agents for the three aforementioned reasons, would this be the
case when dealing with non-diplomatic agents, especially when the first two abovemen-
tioned reasons are lacking? Second, according to another reading of paragraph 59, if the
three judges initially intended to apply such an offer to cover only situations involving non-
diplomatic agents, it would be unreasonable to conclude that they have chosen to restrict
such an offer to the state of nationality of the accused on the basis of the first two above-
mentioned reasons. The only logical justification would be the third abovementioned rea-
son, namely, to save international relations and avoid inter-states diplomatic friction. The
latter justification, however, cannot be taken in the abstract because offering the national
state of the accused the opportunity to act, while it preserves international relations between
the states directly involved, may not save those relations with the territorial or the national
state of the victim. Thus, if the exercise of absolute universality should be limited to an
offer from the third state, that offer should be directed to all states that are directly con-
nected with the accused or the crime, including the territorial and the national state of the
victim. The conflict between those states as to which state should exercise jurisdiction could
be solved through diplomatic channels or classical state practice.
VII. Conclusion
The question of universality of jurisdiction in absentia is highly debatable. The trials held
post-World War II by the U.S. and British Military courts showed recognition to the
principle of universal jurisdiction. But the prevailing language used by these courts inclines
toward the classical or conditional form of universality.
The adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions demonstrated another significant devel-
opment of the concept of universality of jurisdiction. Arguably, the provisions regulating
universal jurisdiction under the Geneva Conventions require the voluntary presence of the
accused on the territory of the state asserting jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the language used
in those provisions does not entail any such restrictive rule and may accommodate a broader
effective interpretation. Consequently, they could be construed in a manner that permits
the exercise of absolute universality to ensure the highest mechanism of fight against
impunity.
Although it has been argued that a number of treaties do not permit the application of
universality in absentia, 12 this does not mean that such practice is prohibited under inter-
national law. Only the idea had not been developed at the time. 2 6 While contemporary
legislations and jurisprudence in some countries exclude this practice, it is allowed in others.
For example, the practice is still allowed in the Spanish, Italian, New Zealand, and Israeli
legislation. Conversely, given the gravity of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, Germany has adopted a new trend favoring such a type of jurisdiction. '27 Although
125. See id. 1 8 (President Guillaume's Opinion reviewing those treaties).
126. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 110.
127. See The New German Code, supra note 71. However, Professor William Schabas argues that states who
are willing to apply universality in absentia "only exercise it when they have a real interest in the offender, rather
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state practice seems to be divided regarding this type of jurisdiction, such controversy may
support the view that a restrictive rule of international law that bars its application is lacking,
as previously demonstrated."' It does not follow from this conclusion, however, that this
type of jurisdiction is not perilous. It could lend itself to abusez 9 and interstate friction,"10
especially if procedures target a high state official or a diplomatic agent. This was clearly
mentioned by the three judges in the joint separated opinion of the ICJ judgment. Thus,
the five conditions set out by the three judges aim to reduce the degree of danger, if a state
has chosen to exercise that type of universality. Notwithstanding this reasonable compro-
mise, the outcome of the judgment that favored the Congo's application caused diversity
in views"' and forced the Belgium Government and courts to re-asses this type of univer-
sality. On April 16, 2002, a pre-trial appeals court in Brussels ruled that the proceedings
than the alleged interest in the good of humanity that publicists all invoke but that states rarely seem to be
concerned about." Nevertheless he believes that states might be hesitant to exercise that type of universality,
because "when the offender is on the territory, they have an interest in dealing with him or her that they rarely
have in other cases." Private Conversation with William Schabas, May 26, 2003.
128. See Section 1.3, supra; Congo v. Belgium Case, supra note 1, $ 51 (Judge Van Den Wyngaert Dissenting
Opinion). Judge Van Den holds the proposition that based on the Lotus case, each state is authorized "to
provide extraterritorial jurisdiction on its territory unless there is a prohibition under international law." She
concludes, however, that such a rule does not exist under an international law that bars investigating or pros-
ecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity committed abroad.
129. For a thorough discussion regarding the pitfalls of universal jurisdiction in general, see Morris, supra
note 31, at 351-59; see also Professor Bassiouni's opinion when he stated: "With respect to the [practice of
universal jurisdiction in absentia], this case is, for all practical and legal purposes, a case of first impression as
there has never before been a state with such extraterritorial jurisdictional reach. One way of considering this
issue is to balance the positive effects of such legislation on the enforcement of international criminal law with
respect tojus cogens crimes against the negative effects of potentially disrupting the stability, and predictability
of the international of the international legal order and its potential for infringing upon human rights because
of the possibilities of politically motivated, vexatious prosecutions, and its potential for multiple prosecutions
(in light of the non-applicability of non bis in idem to [prosecutions] sic by separate sovereigns)." Bassiouni,
supra note 32, at 147. One has to admit that the issue of non bis in idem, the restriction of its application to the
same state sovereign and the lack of respect to foreign judgments might be one of the pitfalls for the exercise
of universal jurisdiction in absentia. Some states do not recognize or give weight to foreign judgments and thus
a person could be prosecuted or tried simultaneously for the same offense. According to this writer, however,
a sort of practice of universality in absentia, which does not exceed the limit of initiating proceedings, or securing
the presence of the offender as opposed to the actual trial, renders the argument of violating the non bis in idem
principle sometimes inapplicable. For a discussion regarding the problem of foreign judgments and the appli-
cation of the non bis in idem principle, see Mohamed El Zeidy, The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy in International
Criminal and Human Rights Law, 6 MEDITERRANEAN J. Hum. RTs. 183, 204-09 (2002); see also Christine Van
Den Wyngaert et al., The International Non Bis In Idem Principle: Resolving Some of the Unanswered Questions, 48
INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 779, 784 (1999).
130. Morris, supra note 31, at 354; see also CAsSESE (ICL), supra note 41, at 289-90 (providing a detailed list
of pitfalls especially for exercising universality in absentia).
131. See Bassiouni, supra note 32, at 147. "A solution that would preserve the positive effects and mitigate
the negative ones is to recognize a state's right to enact such legislation, but not to recognize a state's power
to seek to enforce such legislation beyond that state's territory, unless a nexus can be shown to exist with the
enforcing state, such as the physical presence of the accused in that state. The result would be that Belgium's
law would be declared not to be in violation of international law, but that its attempt to secure the arrest of
the accused outside its territory would be invalid unless it can be shown for enforcement purposes that a nexus
to the enforcing state exists." Id. Although Professor Bassiouni's statement refers to a "solution," a close reading
of his statement emphasizes that he opposes the entire idea of universality by default, but in a relaxed indirect
manner. Apparently he believes that universality in absentia lies within the category of enforcement jurisdiction
which is normally prohibited by the classical rules of international law.
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against Mr. Ndombasi were "inadmissible (irrecevables) from the beginning" because the
accused, at the time of issuing the arrest warrant, was not voluntarily present in Belgium,
as required by virtue of article 12 of preliminary title of the Code of Penal Procedure."3
Moreover, on June 26, 2002, the same court reached the same conclusion with regard to
the proceedings against the President of Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo and others. It further
concluded that the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia was inconsistent with inter-
national law.' 3' Interestingly, on February 12, 2003, the Court of Cassation reversed this
decision. -4 It held that although article 12 of preliminary title of the Code of Penal Pro-
cedure requires the presence of the accused on the Belgian territory, this article is limited
to a certain category of crimes that does not include genocide, crimes against humanity, or
the grave breaches under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 3I By contrast, heinous crimes
similar to those covered by article 7 of the 1993 War Crimes Act as amended in 1999, does
not call for such a requirement.1
36
Furthermore, some lawmakers announced legislation to save this type of universality be-
fore the Court of Cassation hears these cases. 3 7 They proposed a broader model of article 7
of the War Crimes Act, which would clearly permit the exercise of universality in absentia."'
Despite such fear, the Court of Cassation was supportive. Nevertheless, due to tensions be-
tween Belgium and other countries, such as Israel and the United States, resulting from this
law, the government passed two amendments.' 9 The first amendment took place in April
2003,'"' and may be seen as regulating rather than abolishing universality in absentia.,'
132. Reydams, supra note 60. See also Abbas Hijazi et al. v. Sharon et al., Decision ofJune 26, 2002 (holding,
by the same court, but differently composed, that the proceedings against Sharon and others were inadmissible
for the same reason listed above). Id.
133. Id. The court observed that such practice violates the principle of sovereign equality of States.
134. Cour De Cassation, 2E Chambre, Arret no. JC032C1 1, available at http://wwxv.cass.be/cgi-juris/
jurif.pl http://w.cass.be/cgi-juris/jucf.21.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). The Court expressed itself in the
following words: "Casse L'arrbt attaque en tant qu'il dit irrecevable l'action publique exercee i charge d'A.Y
et D'inconnus ... Renvoi la cause, ainsi limitee, la cour d'appel de Bruxelles, chamber des mises en accusation,
autrement comos~e." Id. at 9.
135. Id. at 4-5.
136. Id. The original text appears as follows: "Qu'etrangers au contenu du chapitre II du titre prliminaire
du Code de procldure plnale, les crimes de droit international vises par la loi du 16 juin 1993, modifibe par
celle du 10 fevrier 1999, ne constituent pas des infractions pour la poursuite desquelles la loi requiert,
lorsqu'elles ont 6t6 commises en dehors du territoire, que l'inculp6 ait t6 trouv6 en Belgique.".Id. at 6.
137. Reydams, supra note 60.
138. Id.
139. BBC NEws, WORLD EDITION, Belgium Restricts 'Genocide Law,' Apr. 6, 2003, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2921519.stm [hereinafter Genocide Law]; Paul Ames, Former Prime Minister Pro-
poses Repealing Belgian War Crimes Law, Associated Press World Stream, June 21, 2003, available at LEXIS,
News Library. The U.S. State Department spokesman, Philip T. Reeker, reacted towards the first Belgian
amendment by saying, "..., even with the recent amendments, the law does not work and we believe should
be repealed." Id.
140. Luc Reydams, Commentary on the 2003 Amendment of the Belgian Act Concerning Grave Breaches
of International Humanitarian Law, I J. INT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming 2003).
141. Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Questions and Answers on the "Anti-Atrocity" Law,, 3-4 (Feb. 2003),
available at http://wws.humanrightswatch.org/campaigns/icc/belgium-qna.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights
\Vatch]. According to the new amendment, before the victim could file a case directly, there should be a link
with Belgium, whether because the suspect is on the Belgium territory, the crimes were committed in Belgium,
or because the suspect or the victims reside in Belgium. However, if such a link is lacking, the victim must take
the case to the state prosecutor who will decide whether the case is well-founded. The decision is subject to
appeal. Id. Such an amendment seems to be a positive step to avoid abusing such dangerous type of universality.
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Under the so-called "anti-atrocity" law, 42 the prosecutor can proceed with a case in the
absence of any link with Belgium, only if the countries concerned with the crimes lack
"democracy or fair trials."141 Moreover, the amendment affirms a significant legal issue,
namely, that the 1993 War Crimes Act intended to apply even if the suspect was not present
in the territory of Belgium at the time of initiating proceedings.-4 Thus, an investigation
could be opened in his absence. 45 However, it seems that the first amendment was not
sufficient to satisfy the United States' demands. - Under continuous political and economic
pressure from the United States, the Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, declared
that the 1993 law (as amended in 1999) would be fully scrapped.' 4' A new bill is going to
be approved by the Parliament within the coming weeks, where only cases involving Belgian
citizens or residents would be considered. 4 At this stage it seems that universal jurisdiction
in absentia would be quashed. Even if it is so, this does not lead to the conclusion that the
principle does not stand any more. It is clear that such change is based on political and
economic pressure rather than any legal justification.149 The United States threatened to
move the NATO headquarters out of Belgium if the law was not scrapped. 50 The latter
action taken by the Belgian legislator, which contradicted the Belgian higher Court's finding
demonstrates that when politics interferes law could be suspended.
Almost the same regulations appear in a revised study by Human Rights Watch, Belgium: Questions and
Answers on the "Anti - Atrocity" Law, p. 3 (June 2003), at http://www.humanrightswatch.org/campaigns/icc/
belgium-qna.pdf (last visited July 15, 2003). According to this study, if a link is lacking between Belgium and
the crime such as: the suspect is not on the Belgium territory, the crime is not committed in Belgium, or if the
victim is not a Belgian national "or has not lived in Belgium for at least three years," "cases may only be
brought by the state prosecutor." Id. at 3. However, see Reydams' different opinion who mentioned that cases
that bears no link to Belgium "becomes the prerogative of the federal prosecutor (procureurfedidlral)." For a
detailed commentary on the first Act, see Reydams, supra note 140.
142. Id. at 1.
143. Genocide Law, supra note 139.
144. Human Rights Watch, supra note 141, at 4.
145. Id.
146. Craig S. Smith, Belgians Angry with U.S. : War-Crimes Law Already Amended to Suit Americans, Foreign
Minister Says, THE GAZETTE (Montreal, Quebec) June 14, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
147. BBC Monitoring International Reports, Belgian Government Cancels Genocide Law, July 14, 2003, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library.
148. Belgian Change Law Condemned, July 14, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
3063427.stm.
149. This change is intended to prevent prosecution of President Bush, Sharon, Rumsfeld, and other U.S.
State officials. Paul Geitner, Critics Say Changes to Belgian War Crimes Law Won't Solve all Cases that Angered
Washington, ASSOCIATED PREss, July 30, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
150. Paul Ames, Human Rights Campaigners Criticize with Changes to Belgian War Crimes Law, Associated
Press World Stream, July 13, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library; War Crimes Complaints Filed Against
Bush, Blair, CH. TRIB., June 20, 2003, at 12, available at LEXIS, News Library.
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